Table of Contents
Before a firm’s satisfaction of settings under the related single market order, the firm approved in a European Economic Area (EEA) state is qualified for bear on allowed exercises in other European Economic Area nations by either practicing the privilege of the foundation of either a branch or potentially operators or giving cross-outskirt administrations. This is called to in Financial Services, and the Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) and the EEA right and the activity of this privilege is referred to as passporting.
The exercises that are based on passports rights are set out in the significant European Union single market orders. Exercises that are insecure by the orders and are not based on passporting rights requires the firm wishing to bear on this exercises to contact the important skilled specialist of the host nation keeping in mind the end goal will be to decide if coordinate authorization is required.
Passporting rights just apply inside the EEA. In this way, for instance, they do not have any significant bearing on the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands, because these nations are not members of the EE. Even though Switzerland is not an EEA state, Swiss general back up plans has the privilege to set up a foundation in the EEA under the arrangements of extraordinary two-sided settlements between Switzerland and the European Union. EEA general safety net providers additionally have proportionate rights regarding Switzerland under these bargains. Unique courses of action likewise apply in connection to Gibraltar.
On the off chance that a controlled firm needs the passporting rights out of or into the United Kingdom under the single market mandates, the EEA home state director, or the firm, ought to educate the proper UK controller of the company’s aim to do as such
The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) is the head controller for outward passporting rights for double managed firms regarding the nine current single market mandates. The PRA will oversee evaluating the following warnings: Dissolvability II Directive (2009/138/EC), Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2004/39/EC), Protection Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC), Installment Services Directive (2007/64/EC), Capital Requirements Directive (2013/36/EU), Undertaking Collective Investment Scheme Directive (85/611/EEC), Elective Investment Fund Managers Directive (2011/61/EU) and Second Electronic Money Directive (2009/110/EC).
The PRA will counsel the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) regarding all travel permit warnings.
Evaluation of outward passporting firms
The Prudential Regulation Authority will look for consolation about the dangers postured to the PRA’s targets by UK firms wishing to work inside the European Economic Area. The profundity of the PRA’s audit of passporting warnings will be proportionate to its effect on the PRA’s destinations, inside the degree allowed by the pertinent order.
An endless supply of an outward passporting warning from a UK firm, the PRA will evaluate the sufficiency of the company’s assets and managerial structure and whether the firm meets the prerequisites under the important mandate. It might likewise survey whether critical people are fit and appropriate to complete the proposed business.
The PRA’s forces in connection to outward passporting shift as indicated by the significant mandate; however the PRA will anticipate that organizations wishing will have passporting rights out of the United Kingdom to give data prone to educate the PRA’s continuous supervision of the UK parent and the combined gathering.
The warning must give the data set out in the single market mandate material and incorporate whether the aim is to set up a foundation or give cross-outskirt administrations into the host state. Credit organizations must incorporate the data required and finish the significant layout set out in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 926/2014.
Any resulting changes to the first warning subtle elements, for example, changes of address, administration, or authoritative structure, must be informed to the PRA before the change is actualized (unless caused by conditions past the association’s control), as per the HM Treasury EEA Passport Rights Regulations (SI 2001/2511).
Credit establishments must advise any such changes to the PRA utilizing the frame in Annex I of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 926/2014. If a credit foundation intends to end the visa, it must advise the PRA utilizing the shape in Annex IV of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 926/2014.
A firm from an EEA state would need passporting into another EEA state on either an administration, in which it doesn’t have a physical nearness in the nation it is passporting into or a branch, in which the firm opens another office in the nation it is passporting into a premise. In any case, as a rule, the firm will even now be managed by its home state controller. Clients ought to dependably check when managing an EEA approved passported firm as its procedure for managing grievances.
In case of an endless supply of an internal passporting warning from the EEA supervisory expert, the PRA will survey the hazard postured by an approaching firm to its goals and whether a firm meets the necessities under the pertinent single market order.
Home state chiefs ought to send an internal passporting notification of goal for firms wishing to travel permit into the United Kingdom to the lead UK controller. For internal passporting, the PRA is the lead controller regarding the accompanying two orders. Notification under the accompanying orders ought to be sent from the home state administrators straightforwardly to the PRA. The PRA will counsel with the FCA all the while. Capital Requirements Directive (2013/36/EU); and Dissolvability II Directive (2009/138/EC).
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Evaluation of internal passporting firms
The PRA will look for consolation about the dangers postured to the PRA’s targets by the EEA firms wishing for international ID into the United Kingdom. The profundity of the PRA’s audit of passporting warnings will be proportionate to the company’s potential effect on the PRA’s destinations, inside the degree allowed by the pertinent mandate.
This evaluation will be founded on the data given by home state controllers and any ensuing data demands. This evaluation is expected to illuminate the discourse with the home state controller and to plan for supervision of the firm.
Now and again, the PRA may judge that an EEA firm advising the PRA of its expectation to passporting rights into the United Kingdom postures dangers to its destinations, however, meets the prerequisites set out by the significant EU Directives, and in this way has the privilege to lead a business in the United Kingdom. In such cases, the PRA will precisely consider the instruments accessible to it as a host controller, acting in collaboration with the home controller, to moderate the subsequent dangers.
The FCA is the lead controller for internal passporting for all other EEA orders and will counsel the PRA in certain conditions. Home state controllers ought to send the notice straightforwardly to the FCA; the FCA is required to counsel with the PRA in various situations for instance, where there is a double managed firm in the EEA Company’s prompt gathering.
In an interview with Guardian newspaper, Deutsche Bundesbank president indicated that “passporting rights are tied to the single market and would automatically cease to apply if Great Britain is no longer at least part of the European Economic Area.” The paper discusses the legal environment around EU passporting for UK financial services, currently and after a potential Brexit. The paper also discusses the impacts of Brexit on UK and EU economy. The paper finally reflects analyses, solutions, synthesis, and conclusions.
Britain has voted out of the EU. Britain Prime Minister Theresa May has confirmed by stating that “this is a historical moment from where there can be no turning back. Britain is leaving the European Union.” Article 50 states that it takes two years for a country to withdraw from EU completely which means that Britain will be out of EU by 2019. The following are the set rules that Britain has used to withdraw from the Union.
The decision to withdraw
The decision to leave EU is optional to any of its member. The member states can decide to leave or stay in the EU if it meets the constitutional requirements set in the country. The UK Supreme court made a ruling that set the rules of the constitutional requirements a state should follow in leaving EU. The court ruled that some states, such as Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland had no legal rights for consultation.
Notification to the EU
When British parliament has passed the law under the constitutional rules, the president of EU, Donald Tusk, is notified in writing by the government on the decision.
Negotiation regarding withdrawal
The terms of withdrawal from the union are stated in the article 50. The article states that “the union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that (withdrawing) state, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.” Withdrawing state and the European Commission are the two parties that conduct the negotiations which are later decided by European Council. Though the withdrawing state retains its full membership throughout the negotiation, it does not participate in settings of European Council discussion. Under article 50 the negotiation process is well explained under the measure of the European Council. The ordinary rule is applied, and then a negotiating mandate is set for the commission. The council can hire a negotiator it is willing and can put up a special committee to work together with the commission. After the negotiations are over, the European Parliament gives its assent to the draft withdrawal agreement.
Agreement to the negotiated terms
For the withdrawal proposal to be authenticated, withdrawing state must submit a withdrawal agreement. The withdrawing agreement is also required from European Parliament and from “super-qualified majority” which is the majority vote of the remaining states. The majority is acquired from the twenty-seven states by acquiring at least twenty of the states.
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The impact of Brexit and possible approaches
The exit of Britain in the European Union is a major concern for most of the businesses. The uncertainty surrounding the relationship between Britain and the European Union is already causing trouble in the UK. The effects are being felt; from the bad economy to the decrease in the value of the Pound. It is the first time the European Union is facing such a challenge where it is on the blink of losing one of its members. The exit will have a major effect on the economy of both Europe and the United Kingdoms. Not only the economy but also the social, political set up of the World. It is logical to state the intensity of the effect will be determined by the type of relationship that comes with the departure. This can be accessed through five models; the Norwegian-style EEA agreement, FTA-based approach, Turkish style custom union, MFN-based approach, and Swiss-style bilateral accord. These models will help the effect of Brexit.
The MFN-based approach
Assume the UK leaves the EU without setting up any of the five option courses of action discussed in the article. At that point, the nation’s trading activities with both the EU and all whatever remains of the world would be administered by the WTO. Starting from 2015, the WTO has 161 individuals including every single real economy and most minor ones. Under WTO governs, every part should give the same ‘most supported country’ (MFN) advertise get, including charging similar taxes, to all other WTO individuals. The main special cases to this rule are that nations can decide to go into an unhindered trade agreement, such as the EU or EFTA and can give special market access to developing nations.
As a World Trade Organization member, the UK’s exports to the EU and other WTO individuals would be subject to the importing nations’ MFN taxes. Contrasted to EU or EFTA tariffs, this would be a raise the total cost of exporting to the EU for UK firms. The UK’s trade policy would likewise be liable to WTO rules. Since the WTO has gained far less ground than the EU in changing trade benefits, this would mean decreased access to EU markets for UK benefit makers.
The WTO has no arrangements for free movement of labor, so under this situation, free labor mobility between the EU and the UK would stop. In any case, free development of capital between the UK and EU would presumably proceed, as the EU limits on capital mobility not just inside the EU, but also in nations outside the EU.
In the wake of leaving the EU, the UK would never again be bound by the EU’s regular outside tax and would be allowed to set its MFN duties on imports. As a beginning stage, the UK would be well on target to acquire the EU’s tariff duties, yet it could then reduce its import levies beneath EU levels to bring down import costs for UK shoppers and firms which will lead to an increment in the competition faced by UK organizations.
In any case, since the normal levy charged on imports to the EU is just 1% there is a restricted degree of additionally duty diminishments. There is additionally restricted the degree to bring down non-duty hindrances through one-sided activity since decreasing non-levy obstructions frequently requires blending arrangements, controls, or item gauges crosswise over nations, which requires worldwide understanding.
Being outside the Single Market would empower the UK government to set financial arrangement also, administrative gauges without assessing the inclinations of other EU individual groups. However, any disparity in control between the UK and the EU would now go about as a non-duty obstruction to exchange and raise the cost of working with Europe.it is unverifiable how leaving the Single Market would influence the UK’s financial arrangements and controls and whether any progressions would be advantageous. Even as an individual from the Single Market, the UK’s labor and product markets are considerably not so much managed but rather more adaptable than those of other EU nations.
The UK’s labor and product market display is comparable to the levels of adaptability to Canada. Furthermore, the United States is significantly less controlled than those of non-EU nations, for example, Norway and Switzerland. This demonstrates the Single Market provides scope for nations to adjust financial controls to suit political inclinations.
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The Norwegian-style EEA agreement
The European Economic Area (EEA) was built up in 1994 to give European nations that are not part of the EU an alternative to be part of the Single Market. The EEA involves: – all individuals from the EU together with three non-EU nations: Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, Individuals from the EEA are a piece of the European Single Market, and there is the free development of products, administrations, individuals, and capital inside the EEA. Since EEA individuals are some portion of the Single Market, they should execute EU rules concerning the Single Market. These rules include counting enactment concerning business, customer security, natural and competition policy.
EEA enrollment does not oblige nations to take an interest in money related union, the EU’s regular remote and security policy or the EU’s equity and home undertakings approach. EEA individuals likewise do not take an interest in the CAP/. While there is facilitated trade inside the EEA, EEA individuals are not part of the EU’s traditions union, which implies that they can set their outer levy and lead their exchange transactions with nations outside the EU. EEA individuals viably pay an expense to be a piece of the Single Market. They do this by adding to the EU’s provincial advancement supports and adding to the expenses of the EU programs in which they take an interest. In 2011, Norway’s commitment to the EU spending plan was £106 per capita, just 17% lower than the UK’s net commitment of £128 per capita l. Ending up a part of the EEA would not create considerable monetary investment funds for the UK government.
Joining the EEA would also enable the UK to remain part of the Single Market while not taking an interest in different types of European joining. An important finding of research on the financial outcomes of leaving the EU is that even though Brexit would hurt the UK’s economy through a decrease in trading activities, the cost is little when the UK stays even more financially coordinated with the EU. Subsequently, EEA participation is an engaging choice for those allured by the financial advantages of the EU, however, who are not in support of a union with more ties between the countries as time goes by.
There are different drawbacks to joining the EEA besides notwithstanding the enrollment expense and the need to follow EU regulations. While EEA individuals have a place with the Single Market, they are not part of the more profound unification that happens inside the EU. For instance, as an EEA part, Norway does not have a place with the EU’s traditions union. This implies Norwegian exports must fulfill natural source prerequisites to enter the EU duty-free. With the developing many-sided quality of worldwide supply chains, checking an item’s origin has turned out to be costly. On the off chance that the UK joined the EEA, part of this cost would be borne by UK firms. Exporters would need to restrain their utilization of imported from outside the EU to meet the EU’s rule of origin. The EU can likewise utilize hostile to- dumping measures to limit imports from EEA nations, as happened in 2006 when the EU forced a 16% duty on imports of Norwegian salmon. Norway’s inability to attempt the more profound unification sought after by EU nations have brought down Norway’s production level. While these results of EEA participation would expand the cost of working together with the EU, the more imperative disadvantages of embracing the Norwegian model would be political. Non-EU individuals from the EEA must acknowledge and actualize EU enactment overseeing the Single Market without having any part in choosing the enactment. The EU sets the standards of the Single Market, not the EEA.
By leaving the EU to join the EEA, the UK would surrender its impact on all EU choice making, including how to administer the Single Market. In this sense joining the EEA involves surrendering considerably more power than being a piece of the EU. EEA individuals must consent to execute enactment that they have nothing to do with choosing.
For a moderately huge nation, for example, the UK, which is acclimated to having an obvious choice in European and world undertakings, this is probably going to be a troublesome position to acknowledge. For illustration, the administration would have no chance to stop recommendations that it accepted hurt the UK’s national intrigue or to drive forward strategies it bolsters for the most part, for example, encouraging the progression of trade administrations. In case a vote to leave the EU is nullified by the citizens as a vote against surrendering UK power to the EU, by then joining the EEA could without much of an extent be comprehended as selling out of the spirit of the aftereffect of the submission.
Free Trade Association-based approach
Going by the Norwegian or Swiss models would enable the UK to remain financially coordinated with whatever is left of Europe and to take part in at any rate a few sections of the Single Market. In any case, a vote for Brexit could lead the UK to look for a more unequivocal break with the EU. At the point when the UK quit joining the EEC in 1957, it established EFTA as another choice. EFTA is an unhindered trading area covering all non-farming products. EFTA likewise has free exchange concurrences with the EU and various nations.
Re-joining EFTA would ensure UK merchandise levy free access to the EU and guarantee the UK tax-free on merchandise imported from the EU. Nevertheless, it would not accommodate free movement of individuals or facilitated trade in administrations between the UK and the EU. Since the UK would not have a place with the Single Market, re-joining EFTA would likewise most likely outcome in a progressive disparity between a financial direction in the UK and the EU. This would increment ‘non-tax hindrances’ to trade between the UK and the EU. Assess the expenses of Brexit to the UK economy would come basically from increments in non-levy obstructions between the UK and the EU, not from changes in duties. This proposes there would be a financial cost to pay for joining EFTA.
In 1960, when EFTA appeared, reducing levies was the primary objective to bring down trade costs and advance global monetary incorporation. However, the achievement of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the EU and other local and mutual trade understandings in bringing down duties have moved the concentration of the present exchange arrangements –, for example, the Transoceanic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – towards non-tax boundaries and exchange in administrations and capital. EFTA isn’t intended to advance incorporation in these ranges.
Thus, all EFTA individuals have either left to join the EU or looked for more noteworthy coordination with the EU through different channels. At the exhibit, the individuals from EFTA are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. All these nations are either individuals from the EEA (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) or have their concurrences with the EU (Switzerland). Unless the UK wishes to quit all types of financial reconciliation aside from levy evacuation, re-joining EFTA is not a remain of solitary answer for the issue of what ought to take after Brexit.
Swiss-style bilateral accord
Switzerland is not an individual from the EU or the EEA. Preferably, it has arranged a progression of reciprocal bargains administering its relations with the EU. Typically, every settlement accommodates Switzerland to take an interest in an EU arrangement or program. For instance, among numerous others, there are bargains covering protection, air activity, benefits, and misrepresentation counteractive action. Switzerland is additionally an individual from the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which furnishes with the expectation of complimentary exchange with the EU in all non-horticultural products. The two-sided settlement approach permits Switzerland the adaptability to pick the EU activities in which it wishes to partake. Through EFTA participation and an understanding covering specialized boundaries to exchange, Switzerland has accomplished a comparative level of products advertise coordination with the EU as EEA nations.
Presently, there is likewise free development of individuals amongst Switzerland and the EU, although, in February 2014, Switzerland voted in a choice to force confinements on migration from the EU that would abuse its concurrence with the EU on the free development of individual groups. It stays to be seen whether or how the Swiss government will execute this vote and what will be the results for Swiss-EU relations. Switzerland and the EU have not achieved an exhaustive strategy covering exchange administrations. Subsequently, Switzerland isn’t a piece of the Single Market for authorities, and Swiss monetary foundations regularly serve the EU showcase through auxiliaries situated in London.
Similarly, as with the EEA nations, Switzerland has no impact over the plan of the EU programs in which it takes an interest. It settles on an in or out decision, yet cannot shape the substance of the projects. The settlements expect Switzerland to actualize strategies and enactment set by the EU. In this sense, Switzerland likewise exchanges combination for power, and generally, Switzerland has remained firmly coordinated with the EU by tolerating most EU monetary direction. Like the EEA nations, Switzerland makes a money-related commitment to the EU to cover territorial financing and the expenses of the projects in which it partakes. Switzerland’s commitment as of late has arrived at the midpoint of around £53 per capita, 60% lower than the UK’s net commitment per capita.
Embracing the Swiss model after Brexit could fit if the UK is searching for a ‘à la carte’ way to deal with European combination. In any case, there are disadvantages. The EU would be under no commitment to serve the UK everything on the menu, which implies that the Swiss model would not give a similar assurance of market get to that EU or EEA participation offer.
For instance, regardless of whether the UK could achieve a concurrence with the EU to take part in the Single Market in administrations is dubious and avoidance from the Single Market would be averse to the UK’s capacity to trade money related and business administrations to the EU. It is of a high probability that the Swiss model would bring about less financial reconciliation between the UK and the EU than EEA participation, prompting higher financial expenses of Brexit. The Swiss model would likewise involve surrendering some power, since the UK would never again have a say in EU basic leadership, yet would need to receive EU enactment to take an interest in the Single Market.
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A vote for Brexit will discharge the beginning weapon on a two-year renegotiation of the UK’s put in Europe and the world. If the UK picks to cut ties with whatever is left of Europe, this renegotiation could on change the political but on a very basic level, monetary, and lawful establishments of UK life that have developed since the nation joined the EU in 1973. On the other hand, if the UK remains some portion of the EEA, the financial and legitimate changes would be considerably littler. Amid the renegotiation, the UK would confront an unavoidable exchange off between financial benefits and political sway. The UK profits by nearer monetary mix with the
EU, however the cost for this reconciliation is permitting the EU control over a few regions of strategy. Leaving the EU does not mean the UK is free from this major exchange off. Now, there is no agreement inside the administration or people, in general, finished what ought to take after Brexit. This mirrors the way that most the other options to EU participation have their claim disadvantages and would force costs on the UK economy. To settle on an educated choice about the benefits of Brexit, voters must know what is expected of Brexit.
To date, neither the Labor restriction nor the Conservative governments discharged recommendations for the UK’s future in case it votes to leave the EU. Similarly, as the gatherings put forward approach declarations in the run-up to a decision, they ought to distribute their plans for a post-Brexit world before the submission. The option situations talked about in this report encapsulate altogether different dreams of the UK’s future place on the planet. The nation’s voters have the privilege to realize what they are picking between when they enter the surveying stall.
Passporting, which permit UK firms to get to clients and money related markets in the EU and EEA, would allow UK firm to trade throughout the bloc even after the Brexit. Brexit means that the UK may not be part of European Economic Area. As explained above with the use of the five models, the UK will be limited regarding going about their trading activities.
If the UK leaves both the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA), passporting rights will probably be lost, although the alternative to arranging two-sided understandings will at present be open. This has incited worries that banks will be compelled to move staff out of London and into the EU.
As per the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), around 5,500 firms enlisted in the UK depend on passporting rights for the money related administrations division, and many firms hold a few visas, which means the aggregate number in the UK is more than 336,000.
Nevertheless, it’s conceivable that not every one of these organizations requires them. On the off chance that, after Brexit, EU clients proactively contact UK-based firms for exhortation or to execute orders and the organizations are not publicizing in the EU, these activities do not require an international ID. Doing a trademark execution test is critical to evaluate precisely what each firm does, and the related prerequisites.
To date, most firms have not done the above examination: while the UK remains a member of the EU, financial servicing organizations such as the banks enrolling with the FCA have the choice to apply for a range of travel papers. It is easy to select what passporting right the financial service organization needs. Similarly, the UK has two options to retain the passporting rights after Brexit.
To begin with, the UK could stay inside the single market, apparently by joining the EEA, which incorporates EU nations such as Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. In any case, that appears to be improbable: EEA individuals must acknowledge free development and decisions from the European Court of Justice, and Theresa May is against both. It would likewise transform Britain into an inactive “rule taker,” since it would never again have control and representation on the EU’s administrative bodies.
The second choice is that the UK based organizations could exclusively build up auxiliaries inside the EU that would have passport rights. The issue for the banks is this would be wasteful, both expanding the many-sided administrative quality and expecting them to put extra capital — and liquidity — behind the business.
Equivalence is a legal concept that has emerged over the past 30 years to facilitate cross-border trading between markets that choose to recognize one another’s standards. Among the first such deal was a 1990s arrangement between the UK and the US covering mutual access to derivatives markets.
Some but not all EU financial legislation accepts the principle of equivalence. There is, for instance, no such provision for commercial banking or primary insurance. Some argue these gaps would need to be filled for the mechanism to be a credible option for the UK.
Equivalence offers certain preferences, in that it doesn’t require the two sides to reflect each other’s principles and enactment. Organizations from one sector can offer financial services to another because their gauges are sufficiently comparable that clients will be ensured of protection. So the UK could in principle hold access to the EU market, without accepting EU sector or duplicate out its laws.
Equivalence is not without issues. One is that equivalence can, without much of a stretch, be renounced, at only 30 days’ notice under existing EU enactment. Banks say this does not make for a sound establishment for long-term investment.
Another is the nonappearance of a concurred meaning of equivalence. This leaves open the likelihood of the EU compelling the UK to execute rules it doesn’t care for, with an end goal to remain equivalent. This could bring about lost administrative control and even represent a risk to money related security.
For equality to work, most figure the UK would require a detailed agreement. This could give conviction and set out how the question about definitions and conflicting tenets could be settled. Much will rely upon the EU’s readiness to face the challenges, and on the other hand the nations want to hold the impact on future UK administrative improvements.
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