Table of Contents
Principles of salvage and salvage law under the maritime law have changed over a long time. The most important principle of salvage is that the salvor must be motivated by the prospect of a suitable salvage award to assist in a causality incident to save a ship or cargo or bunker fuel or all, save lives and prevent environmental damage. The salvor’s right to rewards is justified by their successful efforts to save property and lives. However, for a long time, the principle of ‘No Cure No pay’ has been applied in salvage law, which implies that payment for salvors is based on their success to save maritime property and lives. In addition to that, since payment of salvage was limited to compensation for saving a life and maritime property, the issue of environmental protection is ignored despite the fact tankers spill large amounts of oil in accident situations causing environmental pollution. Major maritime accidents such as Christos Bitas and Atlantic Empress resulted in governments denying a place of refuge for casualties for salvage work to be finished. In the absence of a place of refuge, salvors were forced to sink certain ships. Salvors received compensation on ‘No Cure-No Pay’ principle implying that they did not get a normal salvage rewards, and in most cases, were unable to recover their expenses. It was a discouragement not to help the ships that society expected them to save. In order to solve the problem, the Salvage Convention of 1989 amended the prevailing laws pertinent to the environment to include a section that recognizes an award for salvors for using their skills and knowledge to reduce environmental pollution. Second, the convention introduced special compensation to reduce the hardness of the ‘no cure, no pay” principle. The Salvage Convention of 1989 (SC1989) is most significant development in salvage law under maritime law since the midpoint of the twentieth century as it included prevention of environmental protection as criteria for giving salvage awards and reduced the harshness of the ‘no cure, no pay ‘ principle by introducing special compensation.
Salvage Law Prior the SCI89
The most critical concept of salvage law is that the salvor has the right to demand for a suitable reward after successfully completing a salvage operation because the salvor has risked his life and committed his resources to intervene in a causality situation. Therefore, the fundamental principle of salvage and salvage law is to encourage people to save lives and property at risk of being destroyed. The right to an award is justified by natural equity, which permits the salvor to save lives and maritime property for the benefit of the ship owner. The legal principles of salvage have been applied for centuries and were recognized by Roman and Greek legal systems. These legal principles were refined in the English Admiralty Court between the 17 and early 20 Century and approved in the 1910 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Respecting Assistance and Salvage at Sea. Due to the lack of diversification in Salvage law in the 1900s, the 1910 convention was approved by almost all the countries in the world that had to deal with maritime casualties.
The 1920 convention subscribed to the old tradition and formally recognised the principle of ‘No cure, No Pay,’ which required that a salvage award could only be ratified if a salvage operation was successful. In addition, the 1910 convention did not consider the issue of environmental pollution in all of its articles. Article two of the 1910 CUCRRAS states,
“Every act of assistance or salvage which has had a useful result gives a right to equitable remuneration. No remuneration is due if the services rendered have no beneficial result,” …
The principle of ‘No Cure-No Pay’ was detrimental in circumstances that the ship, bunker, or cargo was damaged to the extent that it was of no benefit to the owner. In such a situation, a salvage award was impossible because of the lack of salved fund. In addition, there were problems in situations if several salvors had participated in the salvage operation. Maybe the first group of salvor arrived at the scene of causality, tried to salve, but were unsuccessful and the second group of salvors was called and succeeded. It became doubtful as to whether the first group of the salvors was involved in salving the ship.
These challenges of the principle of ‘No Cure-No Pay,’ disputes often arose among salvors. However, the Melanie v. SS San Onofre (1925) ruling provided the last solution. The presiding judge, Lord Phillimore, decided that salvage was only justified if there was a success in the salvage operation. Any effort or contribution by a set of salvors is entitled to a salvage reward. However, efforts or contributions that were not directly related to the success of the salvage operation were not entitled to a reward. In addition, a contribution that removes a ship from danger and then places it another danger equal to the first one is not entitled to a salvage reward.
Lloyd’s Open Form (LOF)
Loyd Open Contract (LOF) was the most popular ‘No Cure- No Pay” salvage contract and is still used to today. The Committee of Lloyd’s ratified LOF in 1892. From 1892 to 1908, LOF underwent a series of revisions that were finally approved in 1908. Other revisions on LOF took place up to 1980. According to LOF, the salvor received a percentage of the salved value, which could be the value of the ship or bunkers or cargo or all, as a reward for a salvage operation. Customarily, the sum of the reward depended on the success and revitalisation of the lost property. In other words, the person(s) claiming a reward for salvage service cannot be remunerated except if he saves the whole of the property or part of it.
LOF has been used in the salvage industry for more than a century. The main objective of the first version of LOF coined in 1908 was to make sure that salvor received appropriate salvage awards in spite of the location where the salvage operation was conducted. Before 1980, the compensation of salvors under LOF was restricted to the ‘No Cure – No Pay’ terms. However, technological developments in the maritime industry and the increase of marine pollution demonstrated the need to consider remunerating salvors for their efforts to prevent or minimise the environmental damage. A salvor could channel his time and efforts to reduce water pollution but ended up empty-handed because he was unable to salvage the ship or the cargo. In an attempt to solve this problem, a new version, LOF 1980 was introduced, and it was a new improvement as far as salvage law was concerned. LOF 1980 created a variation of the ‘No Cure – No Pay’ in the name of “safety net provisions,” which dealt with oil tankers. However, LOF was not as significant as SCI89 because it gave a safety net restricted to oil pollution and tankers, and ignored other pollutants such as coal, chemicals, and steel bars which were transported via ships.
The Significance of SCI89, Article 13, and 14
Article 14 is one of the most significant contributions of the SCI89, as the existing salvage laws did not mention that a salvor deserved an award for his efforts and contribution towards preventing or minimising oil pollution. In 1980, it was evident that the 1910 convention was not suited for changes that had occurred in the maritime industry by that time. The insufficiency on the part of the 1910 convention was not only due to its out-dated form and language but also due to developments that had occurred in the shipping and salvage industries. The 1910 convention did not have a provision that required the salvor be conferred a salvage award or any other kind of compensation for his efforts and contributions to reducing oil pollution.
Up to 1980, there was a big increase in the number of hazardous materials or pollutants being transported via cargoes. In addition, the size of the ships had increased implying that level of the risk of pollution had risen. For instance, media reports covering the incidents such as the Amoco Cadiz and Exxon Valdez indicated that large amounts of oil had been deposited on water and the risks of pollution were high. Environmental conservation had also become an issue of concern amongst world governments. Salvors had emphasised saving ships in distress but the threat of pollution begun to be one of their concerns. In addition, salvage operations were getting enormously difficult and costly to perform because of the large size of ships and the high cost of building and operating equipment necessary for the salvage operations.
For instance, there were cases in which salvors had to spend a great deal of financial and human resources to execute salvage operations only for national authorities to deny them the permission for the port. In some instances, the rescued ships were destroyed, as it was the wish of various governments in the world. The principle of “No Cure-NO Pay’ made matters worse for salvors as there was no guarantee that they would receive rewards or recover their expenses as such benefits were dependent on the success of their operations, which meant that they were supposed to save property. In other cases, the salvor found themselves in legal suits accusing them of either damaging the ships or causing water pollution in the process of rescuing them. As a result, salvors begun to launch complaints that their efforts and contributions in saving ships and preventing or minimising pollution were not being rewarded. At first, most of the players in the maritime industry accused salvage industry of raising false alarms, but they got the attention they deserved as major salvage companies became insolvent. The world realised that maritime industry would miss the salvage industry, as they would be no one to perform rescue missions in case of casualties. The decline of salvage industry became a big concern for governments of the world, as it would be costly for them to establish similar resources.
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Just as most of the modern laws are influenced by extraordinary and sensational events, the maritime laws are no exception. It is possible to match most of the modern laws with a notable event that drove it. For instance, the Intervention Convention of 1969 was influenced by the `1967 Torrey Canyon and the Exxon Valdez incident in 1989 and led to the legislation and adoption of the US Oil Pollution act. Similarly, the Amoco Cadiz was the notable event behind the changes in salvage laws including the SCI89. The Amoco Cadiz was a maritime disaster that resulted in over 200 000 tonnes of crude old being spilt on the sea when the ship sunk near the Island of Ushant. The damages made the French government to seek compensation through litigation in the US, which resulted in Amoco paying $ US 204 000 000. Official reports about the Amoco Cadiz incident indicated that disaster would have been preventable had salvage operations launched at an earlier stage. The delay in salvage operation was attributed to the salvage firm’s inability to have acceptable salvage contract.
As a result of the Amoco Cadiz incident, it became clear that prevention of environmental damage could be possible if conditions were made favourable for salvors to resume their services and offer salvage help with the least delay. As a result, the maritime industry had to abolish or amend the salvage laws that conferred rewards to salvor only if they had salvaged property and ignoring the fact expenses were inevitable. A few changes to the salvage laws were attempted on an international level to make salvor’s position favourable for them. Although the LOF 1980 tried to intervene in the situation, much of the changes in the salvage law are attributed to the SCI89. The significance of SCI89 was its objective to encourage salvors to conduct a salvage operation with the intention of not only rescuing the ship but also protecting the environment. ,
SCI89’s concern about the dangers of environmental pollution is apparent in the opening statement of the convention, which notes that the increased concern for environmental safety has brought the need to review the salvage laws contained in the 1910 convention. The opening statement further states that the new laws should recognise that timely and efficient salvage operations would rescue ships and property in danger, and protects the environment. As a result, the new laws should ensure that appropriate incentives are availed to salvors that perform salvage operation to save ships and property in jeopardy.
Article 13 provides criteria for determining the value of salvage award. Although it stresses that the success of a salvage operation is fundamental in fixing the reward, it provides other factors that should be used for the same purpose. Article 13 is one of the major reasons that make SCI89 one of the most significant developments in salvage law under the maritime law since the midpoint of the 19th century to today. SCI89 was a significant change in salvage law because it created an exemption to ‘No Cure- No-Pay’ principle when the salvor performs salvage operations but fails to save the ship or cargo but manages to save the environment from pollution. This influenced other salvage laws such as LOF that regarded the new SCI89 provision as being significant and implemented in its new version, LOF 1990. SCI89 was more significant than LOF 1980 because the latter gave a safety net restricted to oil pollution and tankers and ignored other pollutants. SCI89 does not only apply to oil but also any other substance that is a threat to the environment including dangerous chemicals such mercury and liquid sulfur that could destroy the habitat of aquatic life.
Article 13 spells out the criteria for fixing rewards
Article 13.1 (a) the Salved Value of the Vessel and other Property
This is the most important and material criterion listed in the Article 13. The value of the vessel and amount of property salved is vital in determining the value of a salvage award. Statistics indicate that between 1978 and 1998, the value of slaved property like ships, cargos, and bunkers was US 21.39 billion. About two-thirds of the salvage operations were conducted under LOFs ‘No Cure-No pay” principle. Nevertheless, since the inception of the SCI89, the level of awards rose because of the implementation of elements in the convention.
Article 13.1 (b) The Skill and efforts of Salvors in Reducing Environmental Damage
This criterion was non-existent in the 1910 convention and deals with the threat of damage to the environment. Its significance in SCI89 is indicated by widespread use in salvage cases after 1989. For example, in the Nagasaki Spirit case, the presiding judge noted that the salvor’s efforts to reduce environmental damage were successful and recommended that the salvor receive a bigger salvage award than it would be possible.
Article 13.1 (c) The Level of Success achieved by the Salvor
This criterion emphasises the ‘level of successes reached by the salvor(s). The improvement of the existing convention stated that a salvor had to be successful in his salvage operations to receive a reward. The criterion is vital in cases in which the efforts of the salvor have brought very little success. For example, when tasked to work on a ship on fire at an anchor in a port and salvor. If the salvor manages to put out the fire in time before it consumes a large proportion of the ship, the measure of success is great, and that should reflect in the final determination of the salvage award. Similarly, if the salvor fails to put the fire in time, the measure of success is little and should reflect on the final determination of the salvage award to be conferred.
Article 13.1 (d) Nature and the Degree of Danger
This criterion attempts to differentiate nature and degree of danger. While nature refers to the conditions under which the salvors underwent the task of saving the ship, degree refers to the extent of a particular danger. For example, salvors that manage to save a cargo of a ship that exploded should be rewarded more than those who performed the same task when the ship is stranded. Similarly, salvors that manage to save the cargo of a ship that fully exploded should receive a bigger salvage reward than those that performed the same task when only a section of the ship exploded.
Article 13.1 (e) Skill and efforts of Salvors in Salvaging the Ship, Bunker or Cargo
All the salvors should receive a reward that reflects the skills and the knowledge used in the salvage operations. Similarly, if the salvors show a high level of skills and pace in performing the salvage operation, that should be reflected when assessing the sum of the salvage reward. Also, if the salvors showcase lack of skills and slow pace in performing the salvage operation, that should diminish the sum of the salvage reward. Additionally, the property might have been saved but if the salvors achieved that with the minimum effort, the amount of the salvage reward should be diminished. Note that the salvors are entitled to reward even if they fail to save property but manage to save a life or lives. This criterion means that all the skills and efforts of the salvor in salvaging a ship, bunker, cargo, or life must be reflected in the final assessment of the reward.
Article 13.1 (f) Time, Expenses, and Losses suffered by the Salvors
This criterion did not exist in the 1910 convention and was inserted in the 1989 convention to reduce the harshness of the ‘No Cure-No Pay’ terms. It is completely independent on the whether the salvors manage to save property or not and focuses on time, expenses, and losses incurred by the salvors. First, the time used by salvors is critical in determining the sum of a salvage reward because of two reasons. In one case, the salvage operations might be difficult, lengthy, and laborious, and in another, become easier and take a short duration of time to be completed. Apparently, the salvors should get a higher sum of a salvage reward if the salvage operations were lengthy and needed a lot of effort. Likewise, salvor should receive good rewards if he incurred a lot of expenses and losses. For example, it is appropriate to inflate the salvage award if one or two of the salvor suffers career-ending injuries or even die.
Article 13.1 (g) Risk of Liability and Other Risks
This criterion did not exist in the 1910 convention and was inserted in the 1989 convention to reduce the harshness of the ‘No Cure-No Pay’ terms. It is completely independent on the whether the salvors manage to save property or not and focuses on the liability and the risks saved by salvor before and while performing the salvage operations. In some instance, salvors are willing to accept liability in case their salvage operation results in losses such as sinking and damages to the ship. This might be inevitable due to the nature of danger and salvage operation activity. As a result, salvors that are willing to give indemnity and expose themselves to imminent liabilities should be rewarded especially if the anticipated losses fail to occur. On the other hand, the liability is not limited to the ship, bunker, and cargo because the risks apply to the salvor’s equipment and servants. For instance, by performing a salvage operation, the salvor is willing to bear the liability for his equipment are destroyed, or his servants suffer career-ending injuries.
Article 13.1 (h) The Promptness of the Services Conferred
Like the two previous criteria, this criterion did not exist in the 1910 convention and was included to reduce the harshness of the ‘No Cure- No Pay’ principle. The promptness of a salvage operation is vital in determining the value of a salvage award in the sense that salvors that promptly respond to a distress call should be well rewarded to encourage such behaviour in future salvage operations. Also, a salvor that arrives promptly in the scene of casualty and quickly assembles his servants and equipment in time should be well rewarded. On the other hand, a case that is characterised by lack of swiftness on the side of the salvor should be justified by a diminished value of salvage award.
Article 13.1 (I) The state of readiness and efficiency of the salvor’s equipment and the value thereof.
This criterion is concerned with the kind of equipment that professional salvors avail for a salvage operation. If a salvor avails a great deal of equipment to use in the salvage operations, the value of a salvage award should be adjusted upwards to suit the mightiness of the equipment. In addition, the salvor that has extra equipment on standby to take the place of the initial ones in case of mechanical damage and destruction should be well rewarded. Such practice is for the benefit of maritime salvage operations and should be encouraged by inflating the salvage rewards. On the other hand, a salvor that avails little equipment and fails to replace them in case of breakdown should have his salvage awards adjusted downwards.
Article 13.1 (j) State of Preparedness and Efficiency of the Salvor’s Equipment.
This criterion is related to criterion (i) in the determination of the value of salvage reward. The state of readiness, the level of efficiency, and the value of equipment must be taken into account while using this criterion to determine the value of salvage reward. A salvor that sets up a nearby salvage station and appears at the scene of casualty with required equipment is deemed prepared and should be rewarded well. A salvor whose equipment operates efficiently without developing mechanical problems is beneficial and should be rewarded well. Lastly, a salvor that avails high-value equipment to perform a salvage operation is a committed professional that should be well rewarded to encourage such level of seriousness.
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Article 13.2 reiterates that payments of a determined salvage rewards should be made by all the ship, cargo, bunker, or life interest in accordance with their values that have been salved. The article further weakens the principle of ‘No Cure – No pay’ as it demands that all the factors related to the ship should be used in determining a value of salvage rewards. For instance, the case of a badly damaged ship that has sunk and the salvors manage to refloat it after a series of exertions. Due to the bad level of damage, the ship might not have a large salved value. Nevertheless, suppose the ship carried a high-value cargo that was removed from her during the initial stages of salvage operations and taken to the safe place for keeping. Now, this case shows that the cargo will contribute to a higher reward even if the ship does not. The fact that salvor used a great deal of effort to salve low-value ship and little effort to save a high-value cargo should not change the value of salvage rewards as all ship, and its continents should be use to determine it.
Article 13.2 is concerned by the ship owners and protects them from paying exorbitant salvage rewards. It states that a salvage rewards exclusive of all the interest and cost but should not exceed the value of the ship, cargo, and bunkers that are salved. Therefore, the article warns salvors to use appropriate resources and personnel during salvage operation to avoid overspending. They should only use a great deal of equipment if they are certain that they will salvage enough property that will balance the number of costs that they have incurred.
Article 14 –Special Compensation
The main purpose of Article 14 was to encourage salvors to perform salvage operations ships and vessels that were badly damaged but posed grave threats to the environment. The salvors were to perform the salvage operation regardless of how costly and time consuming it was going to be, as they would still receive a salvage award. In cases in which there was no or little value to salvor, the provisions of Article 1 required the ship owners, salvors, and any other interested party to negotiate. In addition, Article 14 undertook to encourage salvors that if the ship or cargo is a danger to the environment and salvor does not earn a reward as provided by Article 13, he should be entitled to a reward from the ship owner’s only compensation for the difference. Article 14 determines the salvage rewards in two ways. First, it states that a salvor deserves to be compensated to cover for expenses if the salvage operations are either an operational or a financial breakdown. The compensations should be consistent the level of equipment and personnel used, and other expenses that the salvor can prove. Second, article 14 states that if a salvor conducts a salvage operation and manages to minimise environmental damage, he deserved to receive a payment that includes the expenses incurred and an additional payment of up to 20 % of expenses or 100 % of the amount that will be determined by an arbitrator.
Adoption of SCI 1989 by Countries
SCI 89 was concluded in London in 1989 and took the place of the Brussels Convention. SCI89 implemented was in 1996 as it had been approved by 69 countries that represent about 52 percent of the weight of world’ merchant vessels. Countries that has ratified SCI89 by 1996 included Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Iran, Ireland , Italy, Jordan, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Oman, Poland, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Russia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the USA. Countries that ratified the SCI89 after 1996 include Australia, China, Croatia, Guyana, Hong Kong, Kiribati 2007), Netherlands, and Norway.
Although the primary focus of this paper is SCI89, it is necessary to mention SCOPIC because it was an adaptation of the former. The fact that SCOPIC was adapted from SCI89 indicates that SCI89 remains one of most significant salvage law. In addition, SCOPIC shows that even the most significant salvage law had a constraint that had to be corrected. Just like LOF, SCOPIC borrowed ideas from SCI89 and focused on improving wording problems in Article 14. First, article 14 did not give a reward for salvors to complete their tasks swiftly and P & I clubs thought that could make salvors take maximum time possible to complete their work. Second, P & I clubs noted that article 14 contained two types of limitation with one applying in a situation where there was a danger to the environment and must be proved, and one that was not applicable to the marine environment. As a result of these irregularities P & I undertook to take care of the interests of the salvors, ship owners, and any other interested party to devise a law that would allow salvors get a reward for arriving at the place of casualty even if there is no danger to the environment and receive rewards for the action. SCOPIC sought to ensure the reward to salvor was determined in a commercial manner that is solely dependent on the number of expenses.
SCOPIC is the acronym for Special Compensation Protection and Indemnity Clause. Scopic is made up of 15 clauses that state that the document is mandatory but could be used alongside SCI89 and LOF if the parties to a case accept. In addition, the SCOPIC is relatively a long document, and this section shall only attempt to discuss a few of the clauses that are related to SCI89. The first clause states that SCOPIC is complementary to LOF and it integrates the definitions in LOF, and if there is a disagreement, the elements of LOF are applicable. The second clause states that SCOPIC can be applied under any circumstances if the salvor desires it. The decision to apply the clause of SCOPIC is at the discretion of the salvor. Therefore, until the salvor has decided to apply SCOPIC, the salvage law will not count even if the salvage operations have begun. The third clause requires the ship owners to give $ US 3 million within two days after SCOPIC is invoked. The amount is constant and is independent of the scope rewards to be conferred to the salvor. The fourth clause permits the salvor to withdraw and start applying LOF if no security money is paid. The fifth clause provides the tariff rates under which SCOPIC rewards are calculated. The sixth and seventh clause refers to Article 13 of SCI89 and validates that all the interests are payable. The eighth clause requires that SCOPIC remuneration is paid within one month after the presentation of the claim. The ninth claim states that the salvor can end by note to an owner with a copy to the SCR, if total cost, before a windfall, of services to date and to finish the job will surpass the total of the value of property able to salved and SCOPIC rewards. The tenth claim restates SCI89‘s provision on the protection of the environment which states that salvor should apply his best skills and knowledge to minimize environmental damage. The 11th clause allows ship owners to appoint a representative to represent their interests in the arbitration process. The 12th to the 15th clause are irrelevant to SCI89 has introduced new ideas that are not anyway related to the 1989 convention.
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Case (where SCI1989 was applied)
Most salvage cases are confidential, and it is difficult to obtain documents regarding them without following protocols. However, this paper will use a case presented by the Xu to explain the application of SCI89 in UK case. Xu’s alters the name of the salved ship, the salvor, the names of the ports, and yards for confidentiality purposes. However, the exact quotations of thee arbitrators are used to analyse the case for enhancing accuracy. The following are altered details of the cases
Ship’s Name; Mortar Ship Lucky
Date of Salvage: 11-26/01/1993
Place of Salvage: X Port
Size of the Ship Salved: About 180.3×22.9×14.41 meters and weight 16187 tons in gross
Nature and amount of salved Cargo; 25 tones of South African low Sulphur
Value of Salved Property:
Ship and Bunkers $ US 340 000
Cargo $ US 574 133
Total $ 914 133
Details of the Saving Equipment: Motor Salvage Tug built in the 1980s and weight 1598 tons and measured 69 * 14.22 meters.
Nature of Casualty and Service Conferred:
– Impulsive combustion of fire in cargo
– Removal of 300 tonnes of bunkers and 15 tonnes of diesel oil
– Flooding of water in holes
-seeking permission from authorities to get into the port
Dangers and Risks – N/A
Time of Salvage Operation – 2 weeks
Expenses of Salvage Operation – $ US 352 626
Arbitrator’s Ruling –
The arbitrator requested the respondent to pay the contractors a salvage reward of US 400 763 at an interest rate of 16.25 % per year for 26/01/1993 to date of publication of this award.
Opinion Concerning the Case
From the case, it is apparent that ruling is consistent with provisions of Article 13 and 14 of the SCI89. First, the arbitrator rule has respondent pay $ U 400 & 63 that exceeds the expenses the salvager and is inclusive of the interests rate. Second, the figure has been lower since there was no complication during the salvage process and salvors seemed to have an easier job. Third, the value is slightly more than expenses having been kept diminished because the salvor only spends a few weeks performing the salvage operations. Lastly, the amount of paid as salvage award does not exceed the value of the slaved property, a requirement of sci89.
Throughout the paper, it is evident that SCI89 is the most significant salvage law under maritime since the midpoint of the 19th century. First, it was the first ever salvage law to lessen the harshness of the ‘No Cure – No Pay” terms which only conferred rewards to salvors only if they succeeded in salvaging property. SCI89 achieved by introducing criteria, other than the success of salvage operation that could be used in determining the value of a salvage reward. Some of the criteria introduced by SCI89 included nature and extent of the casualty, skill and efforts of in salvaging the ship, bunker or cargo, time, expenses, and losses suffered by the salvors, risk of liability and other risks, the promptness of the services rendered, and the state of readiness and efficiency of the salvor’s equipment and the value thereof. Second, SCI encouraged salvors to perform salvage operations ships and vessels that were badly damaged but posed grave threats to the environment. As a result, it allowed salvor to receive remuneration even they failed to salve the ship or cargo. Therefore, the SCI89 is significant because it not only changed the perception of salvage rewards but also became a reference point for other salvage laws that were developed after 1989 such as SCOPIC and the preceding versions of LOF.
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